At a Mizuho-organized conference in early June 2026, Pascal Desroches, the chief financial officer of AT&T, said something that sounded more like a negotiation stance than company confidence. He described satellite internet as complementing when questioned about it. not a primary danger. Three weeks later, Oppenheimer produced a report defining low-earth-orbit constellations as a structural threat to the company’s long-term broadband and mobile subscriber growth, downgraded AT&T from Outperform to Perform, and completely withdrew its price target. AT&T’s shares has dropped by about 20% so far this year at the end of July.
The order provides some insight into the direction this argument has taken. For the most of the last three years, Wall Street has viewed Starlink as a rural niche product, beneficial for oil rigs, farms, and areas that cable companies had never bothered to wire. Strong urban and suburban subscriber bases shielded by infrastructure moats that a satellite business couldn’t easily match allowed legacy telecom equities to preserve their value rationale. When SpaceX began its IPO roadshow in June 2026, aiming for a $1.75 trillion valuation, the framing began to fall apart.

The figure is noteworthy not just for its magnitude but also for its reasoning: according to SpaceX’s own market model, Starlink’s total addressable market is worth $1.3 trillion, which is about equal to the sum of all telecom revenues worldwide. It’s not a business that exemplifies a rural specialty. It’s a business that exemplifies the entire concept.
Following Oppenheimer’s example, Bernstein lowered the group’s price expectations for AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, Comcast, and Charter. Jim Cramer used his CNBC segment to openly state that he didn’t want to buy AT&T or Verizon once the Bernstein note garnered enough attention. Before the message was even fully circulated, the market responded. At the end of June, Verizon fell 7% in a single session, giving up the majority of its gains for the year. A 52-week low was reached by T-Mobile. As the least probable of the big carriers to negotiate a Starlink mobile deal, Wells Fargo started AT&T with an Underweight rating and a $18 target, leaving it most vulnerable in the event that satellite direct-to-mobile becomes a viable offering.
The real debate is found in the suburban question. One of the most reputable longtime telecom analysts, Craig Moffett, has repeatedly maintained that Starlink’s economics don’t work in densely populated areas because the satellite capacity is distributed among too many users. One story is the lack of cable in rural areas. Another is vying for market share in suburban Chicago or New Jersey, where cable and fiber are already inexpensive and quick. Even if Moffett’s capacity argument turns out to be true, Bernstein reduced price estimates, implying that the uncertainty alone is sufficient to reprice the industry.
It’s difficult to ignore how much this was hastened by the June 2026 IPO roadshow. Before SpaceX made them a public value question, investor discussions about Starlink were theoretical. The analysts covering AT&T and Verizon are required to inquire about the implications for their coverage firms when a company asserts that its addressable market includes the entirety of global telecom revenues and then values its IPO accordingly, even if they have doubts about the veracity of the assertion. This summer’s downgrade cycle was, in a sense, more about the SpaceX roadshow raising the issue than it was about any fresh information on satellite capacity or subscriber trends.
The reality of the structural danger will depend on how quickly technology advances. According to reports, Starlink V3 satellites lower deployment costs sufficiently to alter customer pricing calculations in ways that previous generations were unable to. A direct-to-consumer U.S. mobile service, which SpaceX hinted at during their roadshow, would be a whole different competitor—not just rural broadband, but a nationwide rival targeting AT&T’s existing 109 million mobile consumers. There is currently no such product. The possibility that it will is priced in by the market.
