There’s a little white dish on a rooftop somewhere in Tehran, angled toward the sky, that most of the neighbors probably don’t look at very closely. It’s not overly dramatic. It doesn’t appear to be resistance. However, that dish is everything to some people in a nation where the government can cut off 92 million people’s access to the internet with just two phone calls to two businesses.
Iran has become proficient in blackouts. The fuel protests in 2019 resulted in a nearly two-week shutdown. Access was once again cut off during the most recent crackdown, which coincided with the violent suppression of anti-government protests. The death toll surpassed 1,800, a figure that human rights organizations themselves warned might be low because it was difficult to count due to the communications shutdown.
The underground network that gives Starlink access to repressive regimes has subtly expanded in these voids, these purposeful silences.
Iran never received an official license for SpaceX’s satellite internet service. Nobody appears to have been significantly slowed down by that legal fact. “It’s plug and connect… just put the terminal somewhere with a clear view of the sky, and you’re good to go,” explained Ahmad Ahmadian, who manages a technology nonprofit called Holistic Resilience and maintains direct contact with Starlink users within the nation. Iranian Starlink accounts that had been dormant were abruptly activated during the most recent protests, and subscription fees were waived. The timing came after Elon Musk and Donald Trump discussed that possibility over the phone.
There are currently an estimated 50,000 Starlink receivers within Iran. When compared to 92 million people, that seems like a big number. It was dubbed a “small window” by Mahsa Alimardani, a technology specialist at the human rights group Witness. A glimpse of a crackdown that the regime was deliberately attempting to carry out in secret. At times, activists have claimed that Starlink was the only source of information about the killings.
Naturally, the Iranian government is aware of this. After the 12-day conflict with Israel last year, it made using Starlink illegal, but it appears to have had the opposite effect. After the war, demand for terminals increased dramatically. It seems that in order to have a connection that the government couldn’t just cut off, people were prepared to risk execution. That conveys something, but it’s difficult to pinpoint exactly what without taking a moment to consider the implications.
The regime’s preferred countermeasure is now jamming. Iranian officials are using what experts refer to as military-grade interference tactics, which are comparable to the strategies Russia has employed against Ukrainian Starlink terminals close to the front lines. Sometimes it works. Iran’s internet infrastructure is remarkably centralized, routed through just two gateway companies, making it relatively easy for the government to block access, according to Doug Madory of network monitoring firm Kentik. Satellite signals can deteriorate, but they are more difficult to destroy than fiber cables.
The relationship between the U.S. government and this entire picture is complex. As part of a larger initiative to treat internet access as a foreign policy tool, Washington funded VPNs, encrypted tools, and eventually Starlink terminals that reached Iranian users for years. A portion of that funding was eliminated in 2024 as part of larger cuts to foreign aid, which infuriated State Department career officials who saw programs quietly fail. Some groups that had been providing terminals to Iran were no longer supported. Others continue to receive funding, but they are reluctant to disclose it for fear of becoming targets.
In any pressure campaign against an authoritarian government, there is a legitimate argument—made explicitly by some Iran policy analysts—that digital access should be given the same weight as sanctions. Suppressing a connected population is more difficult. The reasoning is straightforward: you cannot plan a protest if you are unable to communicate about it. Because it recognizes this, the Iranian government created its own version of the Great Firewall, blocking all but authorized traffic.
The precise person in charge of the underground logistics is less obvious. In order to get a Starlink terminal into Iran, it must be transported across a border, past inspectors, and into the hands of someone who is prepared to install it on a rooftop despite the potential legal risks. There is a supply chain. It’s functioning. However, it functions at a level that makes it difficult for anyone to give a detailed description. Maybe that’s the point. The rooftop dish doesn’t draw attention to itself. That’s the entire concept.
